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One objective of farm commodity programs has been to maintain the family farm 
system as evidenced by the following quote from the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977: 
Congress hereby specifically reaffirms the historical policy of the United States to foster and 
encourage the family farm system of agriculture in this country. Congress firmly believes that 
the maintenance of the family farm system of agriculture is essential to the social well-being of 
the Nation and the competitive production of adequate supplies of food and fiber. 
The quote begs the basic question: Do farm commodity programs help to maintain the 
system of family farms? This paper attempts to answer the question. 
Although considerable attention has been given to government commodity programs 
(see Robison), their impact on farm structure remains controversial and in need of 
additional analysis. For manageability, I arbitrarily narrow the impact on structure to farm 
numbers. However, because size and numbers are highly (inversely) correlated, an analysis 
of farm numbers is implicitly an analysis of size. I do not attempt to predict numbers of 
farms by size or type. Some of these issues were ably addressed for this Committee by 
Richardson et al. and Headley in 1988. 
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Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus. Paper presented at NC-181 committee on fann stmcture annual 
meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico on January 8, 1990. Comments of Marvin Batte, Lindon Robison, and Carl 
Zulauf are much appreciated. Shortcomings of this study are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 
Brief Literature Review 
Three Conflicting Conclusions 
Various social scientists have reached three conflicting conclusions: In the absence 
of government commodity programs, the U.S. today would have (a) fewer and larger farms, 
(b) more and smaller farms, and (c) the same number of farms. 
Programs Reduce Farm Numbers. Many social scientists contend that commodity 
programs have reduced the number of family farms. Quance and Tweeten (pp. 35, 36) in 
1972 .contended that the economic stability provided by ·commodity programs reduced 
numbers and increased size of farms. They stated that "Commodity programs reduce 
uncertainties and unleash the larger farmer to use his efficiency to out-compete the small 
farmer. Programs providing capital and security allow a given equity to be leveraged 
further." Quance and Tweeten also noted that programs encourage expansion of farms to 
utilize efficiently their machinery, labor, and other overhead as acres are diverted by 
government programs. 
Willard Cochrane is the most outspoken current advocate of the position that 
commodity programs increase size and reduce the number of farms. In 1985 (p. 1008) he 
noted that "Maintaining the present level of price and income support helps [the moderate-
size family type farm] some, but it helps their large, aggressive neighbors a lot more." He 
contended that commodity programs have outlived their usefulness because, in net, they 
contribute to loss of family farms. 
The conclusion that farm programs reduce farm numbers remains very much alive. 
The following is a 1989 quote from Swanson (p. 15): 
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The public still appears to associate farming with rural well-being, and to believe that the farm 
programs of the past fifty years have helped farm families. In fact, the evidence is that these 
programs have facilitated the decline in the number of family farms. 
Programs Preserve Farms. Although they did not view the commodity program 
influence as decisive or large, both Gardner (p. 842) and Stanton (p. 327) concluded that 
government programs retarded structural change, i.e. presumably programs slowed 
movement to fewer, larger farms. Richardson et a!. (p. 154) also contended that commodity 
programs preserve family farms: 
Based on the farm survival approach, mid-size farms having low off-farm incomes, high debts, 
and a high proportion of rented land benefit the most from farm programs. Without farm 
program benefits, it is this class of farms that is most likely to be forced out of business. 
The authors reached this conclusion on the basis of farm firm simulations and on data 
showing direct payments by size of farm. 
Programs Have No Impact. Spitze et a!. (p. 67) concluded that "on net, the mass of 
data, evidence, and professional judgments provides little basis for any conclusion other 
than that government price and income payment policy has generally been neutral in its 
effect on farms of varying size." After reviewing theory and empirical data, I (Tweeten, 
1984, p. 33) and Sumner (p. 284) concurred with that conclusion. 
Methodologies for Measuring Structural Impacts of Policy 
At least three methodologies can be utilized to evaluate the impact of commodity 
programs on farm structure: (1) representative farm firm analysis, (2) judgment estimates 
based on theory and scattered empirical observations, and (3) statistical inference from time 
series data. The first approach most often has concluded the programs save family farms, 
the second often has concluded the opposite, and a combination of (1) and (2) has led to 
the conclusion of no net impact. The third, a new approach, is used in this study. 
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Farm Firm Analysis. Farm data by economic class of farm have been widely used 
to judge the impact of commodity programs on farm structure. A common error of 
laypersons is to conclude that larger payments to large farms than to smaller farms give 
large farms the competitive edge and cause fewer, larger farms. This is comparable to 
concluding that wheat causes concentration of production on large farms because wheat 
receipts on larger farms exceed receipts on smaller farms. The appropriate measure of 
scale effect is payment per unit of farm output. 
In 1988, direct payments were a major component of farm income on mid-size· farms, 
less important on small farms, and relatively unimportant on large farms (Table 1}. 
Payments are a large portion of farm income on mid-size farms because these farms 
produce enterprises covered by commodity programs and because they have high 
participation rates. Benefits are relatively less important on small farms because they have 
lower participation rates and receive more of their farm income in-kind. Payments are low 
relative to income (but high absolutely) on large farms because they emphasize enterprises 
such as livestock, fruits, and vegetables not covered by commodity programs and because 
payment limitations reduce participation and benefits. In short, Table 1 data clearly 
illustrate the importance of commodity programs to mid-size farms but do not show the 
dynamic impacts of programs on farm structure. 
Dynamic simulation models of farm firm survivability note that large farms tend to 
persevere in an unstable economic environment by pursuing sophisticated risk strategies 
while small farms persevere by cushioning farm setbacks with off-farm income. Mid-size 
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Table 1. Direct Government Payments as Share of Selected Farm Economic Indicators by Sales 
Class of Farms, 1988. 
Sales Class of Farms ($1,000) 
Item 500+ 250- 100- 40- 20- 10- 5- Under Total 
500 250 100 40 20 10 5 
Direct government 
payment per farm ($) 40,238 31,978 21,118 11,283 5,730 2,331 1,010 374 1,697 
Payments as share 
of (Percent): 
Cash receipts 2.2 9.0 13.7 17.5 20.0 16.1 13.7 18.1 9.6 
Gross farm income 2.1 7.8 11.5 13.6 14.3 10.1 6.8 4.8 8.0 
Net farm income 5.7 24.6 42.3 64.8 87.7 88.5 89.2 'Large 29.0 
Total farm income, 
all sources 5.4 21.9 31.2 35.1 22.1 10.0 3.8 1.2 14.3 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (September 1989). 
farms especially need government payments. However one farm-firm dynamic simulation 
made a case that commodity programs result in fewer, larger farms because of high savings 
and investment rates out of positive transitory income (Tweeten et al., pp. 21-28). The 
shortcomings of simulation is that results depend on assumptions analysts build into the 
model. 
Informed Judgments of Impacts. Because forces influencing farm structure are many, 
varied, and conflicting, and because data are not available with and without farm programs, 
numerous analysts have despaired of empirically determining the impact of farm commodity 
programs on farm structure. The alternative is to rely mainly on deductive judgments and 
scattered data. 
A dilemma of this approach is that the vanous theories, scattered data, and 
fragmented judgments provide no weights to reach consensus from conflicting evidence. 
Not surprisingly, this approach mostly has brought the conclusion that commodity programs 
have no or small net impact on farm structure (see Spitze et al., p. 67; Tweeten, 1984, p. 
33; Sumner, p. 284 ). 
Statistical Inference. Because simulation of farm firm growth and survivability and 
reviews of theory and fragmented data provide conflicting results, the issue of whether farm 
commodity programs increase, decrease, or leave unchanged farm size and numbers must 
be resolved empirically from a more complete model. Modest, single equation models with 
government payments an explanatory variable have been estimated by Gale and by Shepard 
and Collins. Shepard and Collins (p. 614), based on least squares statistical analysis of farm 
bankruptcy rates, concluded that "there is no evidence that agricultural support payments 
since World War II [to 1978] have induced, deferred, or reduced farm failures. As part of 
a pooled state cross-sectional and time series analysis of effects of prices and income on the 
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number of farms, Gale included real government payments per farm as an explanatory 
variable. Because payments per farm are greater for states with large farms than for states 
with small farms, a positive association between farm size and government payments would 
be expected. Yet, Gale (p. 19) found only a "small role of government payments" in 
explaining farm numbers. 
Time series with considerable variation in programs are now available for more 
comprehensive statistical inference. Thus, more comprehensive statistical models can be 
used to infer whether programs influence farm size and numbers. This paper mines this 
third approach. 
I do not attempt to examine the impact of programs by sales class because (a) the 
issue has been treated at least conceptually elsewhere (Richardson et al.; Tweeten, 1984), 
(b) time series data by farm size classes are inadequate or require substantial massage to 
provide the empirical base for multivariate analysis, and (c) the definition of family farm 
is arbitrary. Regarding the latter, under broad definition 95 percent of farms are of the 
family type and have been for years (see Tweeten, 1984, p. 8). Hence trends in numbers 
of all farms provide insights into what is happening to family farms broadly defined. 
Although data and methodology of this paper are intended to improve on prior studies, 
results must be interpreted with caution and need to be supplemented by additional analysis 
as more refined data become available. 
Conceptual Model 
The initial conceptual model is driven by the assumption that farm operators and 
their families are utility maximizers and that equilibrium occurs when farm returns equal 
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nonfarm returns. In this milieu, a small, economically inefficient farm (measuring efficiency 
in the narrow context of returns equal to opportunity costs of resources) can coexist with 
a large, economically efficient farm if the operator of the small farm is willing to pay for 
the farm way of life out of off-farm income. At the margin, the small farmer and the big 
farmer are in equilibrium because they equate marginal social (not just economic) returns 
with marginal social costs. It is not possible to conclude that one operator is more socially 
desirable or rational than the other. Of course, public subsidies differing among farm types 
and sizes can distort social efficiency decisions. I abstract from that issue, herein. 
In equilibrium, operator labor-management return in the farm sector L equals labor-
management return in the nonfarm sector L'. Farm size measured in output (real sales) 
is determined by the labor-output ratio. Assuming that demand for farm food and fiber 
output is umesponsive to price, larger output per farm implies fewer farms in the nation. 
We can extract considerably more information by decomposing determinants of farm size 
as measured by annual output S per farm into various components: 
S = (S/X) (X/L) (L/L') L' (1) 
where: 
S/X is productivity measured by the ratio of aggregate farm output to 
aggregate input X. If aggregate land area and output demand are highly 
inelastic, then additional improved resource-neutral, output-increasing 
technology as measured by S/X increases farm size and decreases the number 
of farms. 
L/X is the factor share of farm labor. It is essentially the inverse of 
aggregate output (aggregate input) per unit of labor. Changes in the variable 
over time reflect scale-biased, labor-substituting technology apparent in 
economies of farm size. Ceteris paribus, a change in technology giving rise to 
economies of size and a falling share of labor causes farm size to increase 
and farm numbers to decline. 
L/L' is the ratio of operator and family labor income on the farm to that in 
the nonfarm sector. For many years after the 1930s, farm income 
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substantially lagged nonfarm workers income. As farm income expanded to 
approach nonfarmers' incomes, farm size expanded. The ratio approaches 1.0 
in equilibrium and hence can be dropped from (1) in the long-run. Data for 
recent decades indicate that farmers' and nonfarmers' per family income are 
somewhat comparable. Greater off-farm employment opportunity reduces 
pressure to expand farm size to achieve the equilibrium farm and off-farm 
income equal to L', other things equal. A higher proportion of farmers' 
income from off-farm sources FY reduces need for income from the farm and 
for expansion of farm size as L' grows. 
L', off-farm earnings, influences farm size because, other things equal, an 
increase in off-farm income raises the opportunity cost of farming and hence 
causes farm size to grow and numbers to fall to "keep up with the Jonses." 
Because equation (1) is an identity, the coefficient of each variable is hypothesized 
to approach unity (absolute value) in a double-log equation. The percentage change in 
farm size as measured by sales is equal to the sum of percentage changes in each of the 
right-hand-side variables in (1). Tweeten (1984) used such methodology to estimate historic 
sources of change in farm size and projected changes to the future. 
Deterministic identity equation (1) is a useful baseline but needs considerable 
modification for multivariate statistical analysis. In empirical analysis the necessity to 
substitute proxy variables for those above and the inevitability of errors in variables and 
omitted variables (all cannot be included due to multicollinearity) makes the relationship 
in (1) inexact. Because data are more adequate to measure farm size in area rather than 
in real sales per farm over time, farm size is proxied by number of farms FAR. Size and 
numbers are closely (negatively) correlated because aggregate acres are quite fixed. 
The variable SX measuring output-increasing technology can be dropped from (1) 
because the object is to measure size in resources or acres. However, this variable 
measuring aggregate productivity might be retained for another reason: An increase in 
aggregate productivity SX which expands output and reduces prices may drive marginal 
farms and excess labor out of agriculture, reducing farm numbers. 
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The factor share of labor (in abbreviated notation XL) represents labor-saving 
technology which without question has changed the face of rural America. It is such an 
important element that a related variable, tractor inventory (TI), is introduced to more fully 
account for scale-biased, labor-saving technology that has so radically altered the structure 
of agriculture and reduced farm numbers.1 The price of machinery relative to labor is 
sometimes used in place of XL and TI although the latter are better suited to a two-step 
analysis where XL and TI are regressed on commodity program variables. 
Closing the gap between farm and nonfarm income substantially changed farm size 
prior to 1950 -- the first year of data used in this study. The disequilibrium variable L/L' 
has been less important in recent decades and is dropped from the analysis to reduce 
multicollinearity. 
After variables measuring commodity programs as well as prices are introduced into 
(1), the statistical form is depicted as 
FAR = f(p, Xi, g, €) (2) 
where prefers to a vector of price variables, Xi refers to variables from (1), g is commodity 
program variables, and € is random error. An increase in real price of farm commodities 
may cause farmers to try to expand aggregate national output and acreage or for 
economically stronger farms to squeeze out weaker farms. Price is measured by real factor 
terms of trade PF, the real commodity price received per unit of resources. The variable 
is commodity terms of trade (parity ratio) times the productivity ratio. 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable" 
ATFY 
DTFD 
DTFY 
D 
E 
FAR 
FY 
Definition (Annual data from 1950 to 1987) 
Permanent income measured by past 5-year moving average 
of deflated (by GNP price) farm income from farm and 
off-farm sources in million 1988 dollars. 
Dummy interaction with transitory income. Variable is dummy 
of 1 for negative transitory income times DTFY, zero elsewhere, 
million 1988 dollars. 
Transitory income measured as deviation of total farm income 
t-1 from ATFY, million 1988 dollars. 
Debt-asset ratio, percent. 
Excess farm capacity as percent of total capacity . Estimated 
by Tweeten for 1987 to be 4 percent. Sum of acreage diversions, 
subsidized exports, and net stock accumulation as percent 
of estimated normal farm output. 
Farm numbers, 1,000. 
Ratio of net farm income to total farm income from all 
sources, percent. 
Source 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 40 and earlier 
issues; Council of Economic Advisors, 
p. 312. 
See A TFY for data source. 
See ATFY for data source. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 58. 
Dvoskin. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 8. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989. 
Table 2 continued. 
Variable 
G 
1 
NW 
PF 
PMPL 
POP 
sx 
Definition 
Direct government payments, million 1982 dollars -- deflated 
by GNP deflator. 
Real interest rate measured by non-real estate farm interest 
rate less GNP deflator inflation rate, percent. 
Farm real net worth, billion 1982 dollars. 
Factor terms of trade measured by real price received per unit 
of output produced by farm production resources. Parity ratio 
times productivity rate, 1977 = 100. 
Ratio of farm machinery price to farm labor price, 1988 = 1.0. 
Farm population, 1,000. Old farm definition used through 1981. 
New definition used after 1981 but dummy variable added to 
independent variable to allow change in intercept. 
Productivity rate defined as output of crops and livestock per 
unit of all production inputs, 1977 = 100. 
Source 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 43; Council of 
Economic Advisors, p. 312. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
1989 and earlier issues; Council of 
Economic Advisors. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 58; Council of 
Economic Advisors, p. 312. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
August 1989 and June 1989; Council 
of Economic Advisors, p. 421. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
June 1989; Council of Economic 
Advisors, p. 421. 
Council of Economic Advisors, 
1989, p; 420. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
August 1989, p. 50. 
1989, p. 29. 
Table 2 continued. 
Variable 
TI 
v 
XL 
Definition 
Tractor inventory, constant dollar real value. Tractor 
inventory deflated by index of prices paid by farmers for 
tractors and self-propelled vehicles, million 1988 dollars. 
Coefficient of variation of net farm income (deflated by GNP 
price index) as ratio of standard deviation of past 5-year 
net farm income to past 5-year mean of net farm income. 
Farm operator, family, and hired labor factor share, percent. 
Source 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 65; U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, June, 
1989. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
September 1989, p. 40; Council of 
Econom.ic Advisors, p. 312. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
August 1989, p. 38; Also unpublished 
work sheet<; from Economic Research 
Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. 
• Variables A for diverted acres and G' for total commodity program outlays omitted because they are not included in subsequent statistical tables. 
Prices and government commodity programs also may influence FAR indirectly 
through behavioral relationships explaining Xi as a function of relative prices, financial 
conditions, commodity programs, and other variables. Hence a two-step model is proposed. 
The direct influence of p and g is found from statistical estimates of equation (2). The 
indirect influence of p and g on FAR is found by regression of the right-hand-side variables 
~in (1) on price (p), commodity program (g), other variables (d), and random error J.L as 
below: 
X; = f(p, g, d, J.L) (3). 
After statistical estimation the various Xi are substituted into (2) to determine the full 
impact of commodity programs. Predicted values of (3) could be used in estimating (2) in 
a recursive formulation to avoid simultaneous equation bias. However, experience suggests 
that statistical efficiency loss more than offsets any gains from reduced bias in the recursive 
system of equations. 
Commodity Programs 
The analysis is restricted to 38 years of annual data (1950 through 1987) because 
earlier data are nonexistent, inaccurate, or from a different structure. As noted above, 
commodity programs are assumed to enter the equation explaining farm size either (a) 
directly as a shifter of the equation or of the independent variables listed earlier explaining 
farm numbers or (b) indirectly through equations explaining right-hand-side variables in 
(1). 
The following variable sets (with simple correlation coefficients between them) 
alternatively measure farm programs: 
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(a) 
(b) 
G and A 
G and E 
(c) G' 
r = .83 
r = .33 
where G is government payments to farmers, A is acres withheld from production by 
government diversion programs, G' is overall government spending on farm price and 
income supports, and E is excess capacity measured by the proportion of farm output 
diverted from markets by acreage diversion, export subsidy, and stock accumulation 
programs. These variables are used in the alternative sets rather than all at once to test 
various hypotheses because G and G' considerably overlap and A and E considerably 
overlap. 
Prices, labor share, tractor inventories, and commodity program variables are 
presumed to influence farm numbers and not vice versa. Real interest rates can directly 
influence farm numbers through credit restraint or can indirectly influence numbers by 
changing land values.2 Higher land values are hypothesized to retard entry into farming. 
Values for all variables are for the current year unless otherwise indicated in subsequent 
tables. 
In summary, the direct influence of government programs is measured by regressions 
of FAR on selected core variables and the program variables listed above. Then core 
variables are regressed on the program variables. Results are substituted into the equation 
for farm numbers FAR to determine the full effects of commodity programs on farm 
numbers. 
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Specific Hypotheses 
Focus is primarily on the following six hypotheses, not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the rate of excess production capacity E (or diverted 
acres A) increases the size and reduces the number of farms. Farms of optimal size before 
diversion find they have redundant labor and machinery after diversion, hence must acquire 
more land to realize economies of size. 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in G or G' increases the size and reduces the number of 
farms. Farm payments and receipts enhanced by government programs reduce internal and 
external capital rationing, causing farm size to grow. Farms consolidate to grow in size. 
Other hypotheses work through intervening variables. 
Hypothesis 3: Quance and Tweeten in 1972 contended that government programs 
provide stability, allowing risk-averse investors to leverage a given equity further. This 
hypothesis is tested by introducing equity (net worth NW) or the equity ratio (D) into the 
equation for FAR and into equations explaining core explanatory variables -- along with 
program variables as before. The hypothesis is that income variance V (reduced by 
programs) and the leverage ratio D or NW covary positively. That is, a given net worth or 
equity ratio results in fewer and larger farms in the presence of greater stability from 
government involvement in farming. 
Hypothesis 4: The Cochrane hypothesis is that farm commodity programs provide 
stability and capital to increase productivity of farming. Increased productivity increases 
output and reduces farm prices and receipts, driving marginal farms out and bringing farm 
consolidation in. This hypothesis is tested by including SX in the equation explaining FAR 
and also regressing SX on variables measuring government programs. The Cochrane 
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hypothesis is similar to the Quance-Tweeten hypothesis 3 but programs operate through 
productivity rather than investment. 
Hypothesis 5: The permanent income hypothesis holds that farm commodity 
programs influence farm size and numbers primarily through the intermediary variable -
- investment (see Tweeten et a!., pp. 21-28). Government programs reduce investment 
because they stabilize farm income. The propensity to invest out of permanent income is 
low, out of transitory positive income is high, and out of transitory negative income is near 
zero, the reasoning goes. For a given average farm income, greater income stability under 
government programs reduces positive transitory income and hence investment. Less 
investment means less substitution of capital for labor and hence means more and smaller 
farms, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 6: Government supports have opposite impacts in the short and long 
run. A strong case can be made that commodity programs maintain or increase farm 
numbers and hold down the size of farms in the slz01t run because they increase survivability 
of marginal farms that would otherwise fail or voluntarily exit when facing unfavorable 
economic conditions. Large farms emphasize fruits, vegetables, livestock feeding, and other 
enterprises not covered by commodity programs. Small to medium-size farms are especially 
prominent in grains, soybeans, dairy, and tobacco enterprises covered by commodity 
programs. Other forces associated with government programs and expressed in the above 
hypotheses work to reduce farm numbers on the average in the long 1un. Thus hypothesis 
6 holds that commodity programs may have opposite affects on size structure by length of 
run. Long- and short-run coefficients are estimated by Koyck-Nerlove distributed lag 
adjustment models. 
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Empirical Results 
Each of the tables reporting empirical results has three main equations: 
1. The first equation measured the contribution of prices alone to farm numbers. 
Of concern is whether prices alone can account for variation in farm numbers. 
2. The second equation measures the contribution of government commodity 
programs alone. Of interest is whether government programs or prices 
account for more variation in farm numbers. 
3. The last equation is considered to be the most adequately specified equation 
and is used to calculate elasticities. It is estimated both by ordinary least 
squares and autoregressive least squares because autocorrelation in residuals 
was found to be a problem in the former. 
Farm Numbers Equations 
1. Prices alone inadequately account for changes in farm numbers FAR over 
time despite significant coefficients on prices in the distributed lag equation 
3.1 (Table 3). The adjusted coefficient of determination (R2 = .519) is much 
lower than for the more completely specified equation 3.3. 
2. Government program variables G for government payments and E for excess 
farm production capacity performed best but explain a small portion of 
variation in farm numbers (equation 3.2). The coefficient of the program 
variable G measuring government direct payments is statistically significant 
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at the .01 level. Variables measuring diverted acres and total inflation-
adjusted spending on farm programs performed less well and are not included. 
3. The more completely specified equation 3.3 accounts for a large proportion 
of the variance in farm numbers. Coefficients of all variables are significant 
at the .02 level or better. 
4. The sign of PF reverses from 3.1 to 3.3. The expected positive sign in the 
more adequately specified equation 3.3 indicates that an increase in farm real 
prices (factor terms of trade) increases the number of farms. All variables 
in 3.3 display signs consistent with economic logic. 
5. Except for variable lnXL, elasticities are of modest size in equation 3.3. In 
equation 3.3, lnXL and InTI replace the related machinery-labor price ratio. 
The variable i indicates that higher real interest rates increase farm numbers 
perhaps because they reduce land prices, easing entry barriers. 
6. Equation 3.3A is estimated by autoregressive least squares because of 
evidence for autocorrelated disturbances as indicated by the Durbin-Watson 
(DW) coefficient. Results were not fundamentally different in equations 3.3 
and 3.3A. 
Results for an equation explaining farm population are included as Annex Table 1. 
Outcomes were similar to those in Table 3 as might be expected.3 
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Table 3. Statistical Results of Least Squares Regression of Farm Numbers (FAR) on Selected 
Independent Variables with U.S. Annual Data from 1950 to 1987. 
IndeQendent Variables8 R2c 
Equation Constant PF PMPL lnXL InTI 1 E G FAR(t-1) DW 
3.1 
Coef. 13518 -58.239 -4876.4 0.00163 0.519 
s.e. 1652 15.802 1218.5 0.00405 
pr> It I <.01 <.01 <.01 0.69 0.719 
SR Elast. -2.46 -2.23 
3.2 
4298 -21.954 -0.1508 -0.00807 0.239 
321 53.068 0.0434 0.00408 
<.01 0.68 <.01 .06 0.153 
-0.05 -0.45 
3.3 
-3527 448.36b 3194.7 -458.81 20.991 -25.625 -0.0299 0.992 
2818 263.61 98.74 179.18 8.357 6.111 0.0077 
0.22 0.1 <.01 0.02 0.02 <.01 <.01 1.285 
0.19 1.36 -0.20 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 
3.3Ad 
Coef. -3807 259.28 3162.3 -341.16 17.689 -15.755 -0.0286 0.993 
s.e. 2940 241.63 118.9 206.67 10.026 5.978 0.0090 
SR Elast. 0.11 1.35 -0.15 0.07 -0.04 -0.08 
a See Table 2 for variable definitions and sources. 
b Variable lnPF. 
c In this and other tables in this paper, the R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
d Estimated by autoregressive least squares; first-order autoregressive coefficient 0.505. 
Farm Labor Factor Share Equations 
1. Measured by statistical significance and adjusted R 2, prices alone do not 
adequately explain variation in labor factor share (equation 4.1, Table 4). 
2. Commodity program variables alone in equation 4.2 do not account for much 
variation in labor share. Commodity programs explain much less than do 
pnces. 
3. The coefficient of the machinery-labor price ratio PMPL in equation 4.3 is 
highly significant but the sign is inconsistent with logiC. The variable is 
replaced in 4.4 by an alternative form, machinery inventory TI in year t-1. 
4. All coefficients have expected signs and high statistical significance in equation 
4.4. Elasticities are relatively large compared to those from equations for 
FAR and TI. 
5. Each 1 percent increase in direct government payments is projected to reduce 
farm numbers -.66 percent according to equation 4.4. 
6. Equation 4.4A is the only instance in the entire analysis where autoregressive 
least squares substantially changes results. Specifically, the coefficient of G 
changes from a significant negative to an insignificant positive. That is very 
important in subsequent evaluation of the overall impact of programs because 
G potentially has a major impact on farm numbers through labor share given 
the large coefficient of XL on FAR· in Table 3. 
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Table 4. Statistical Results of Least Squares Regression of Farm Labor Factor Share (XL) on 
Selected Independent Variables with U.S. Annual Data from 1950 to 1987. 
Indenendent Variables• 
Equation Constant PF PMPL TI(t-1) TIM E G XL(t-1) 
4.1 
Coef. 96.89 -0.4548 -32.98 0.00024 
s.e. 12.11 0.1182 8.80 0.00044 
pr> ltl <.01 <.01 <.01 0.59 
SE elast. -3.00 -2.35 
4.2 
28.24 -0.1645 -0.00095 -0.00079 
2.26 0.3934 0.00032 0.00041 
<.01 0.68 <.01 0.06 
-0.06 -0.44 
4.3 
75.76 -0.3585b 0.6539b -0.2138 -0.00102 0.00603 
7.53 0.0926 0.2296 0.0532 0.00018 0.00232 
<.01 <.01 0.01 <.01 <.01 0.01 
-2.37 0.05 -1.20 -0.47 
4.4 
97.22 -0.4104 -0.00072 -0.0697 -0.00144 
6.73 0.0692 0.00016 0.0070 0.00016 
<.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 
-2.71 -1.43 -0.39 -0.66 
4.4N 
Coef. 71.03 -0.0017 -0.00002 -0.6612 0.00006 
s.e. 7.29 0.0127 0.00004 0.0915 0.00006 
SR Elast. -0.011 -0.04 -3.70 0.028 
a See Table 2 for variable definitions and sources. 
b For t-1. 
c Estimated by autoregressive least squares; first-order autoregressive coefficient 0.99. 
R2 
DW 
0.526 
0.786 
0.230 
0.170 
0.773 
1.219 
0.818 
1.078 
0.993 
The pivotal importance of the equation for XL and the significant first-order 
autoregressive coefficient of 0.99 in equation 4.4A prompted a further 
modification -- estimation of equation 4.4 in first differences. (The time 
variable was dropped because the intercept in the first difference equation is 
equivalent to the coefficient of the time variable.) The estimated coefficient 
of 0.00007 for G and a standard error of 0.00005 in the first difference 
equation were very near the results from equation 4.4A. Based on all 
specifications of variables and functional forms in Table 4, my judgment was 
that equation 4.4A coefficients are the most reliable for use in the concluding 
section to measure the impacts of government payments on FAR through 
labor share XL. 
7. Variables ATFY, DTFY, and DTFD included to test the permanent income 
hypothesis and variable V directly and in interaction with other variables 
performed so poorly they are not listed in Table 4. Although improper 
specification may be the reason for unsatisfactory performance of variables 
measuring impacts of reduced instability on structure, other factors such as 
uncertain continuity in programs inherent in the political process (see Sumner) 
and the tendencies of programs to focus on income enhancement rather than 
economic stabilization could also be factors. 
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Tractor Inventory Equations 
The influence of government programs on farm numbers through tractor investment 
is estimated from equations in Table 5. Tractor inventory is a proxy for and is closely 
correlated with all farm production asset inventory -- results can be interpreted accordingly.4 
1. As in previous equations, prices alone do not perform well in explaining 
tractor inventory (equation 5.1). 
2. Government programs account for more variation in TI (equation 5.2) than 
prices (equation 5.1) but only the coefficient of G is statistically significant in 
(5.2). 
3. The ability of the permanent income hypothesis to explain tractor inventory 
is tested in equation 5.3 with disappointing results. 
4. The hypothesis that stability as measured by V allows a given net worth to be 
more leveraged to increase tractor inventory is tested in equation 5.4. Using 
V alone or interacting with D or NW gave unacceptable results. NW 
performs better alone (equation 5.5) than interacting with V. 
5. The independent variables in 5.5 explain 81 percent (R2 adjusted for degrees 
of freedom) of the variation inTI and all coefficients display acceptable signs 
and statistical significance. NW maybe a proxy for other correlated financial 
variables. 
6. Autoregressive least squares equation 5.5A did not change signs or in other 
ways give results materially different from equation 5.5. 
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Table 5. Statistical Results of Least Squares Regression of Tractor Investment (TI) on 
Selected Independent Variables with U.S. Annual Data from 1950 to 1987. 
Jndenendent Variables" 
Equation Constant PF PMPL ATFY DTFY DTFD NWV NW 
5.1 
Coef. 16133 243.20 -16000 
s.e. 9399 76.64 6477 
pr> It I 0.1 <.01 -0.58 
SR Elast. 0.81 -0.58 
5.2 
34869 
1821 
<.01 
5.3 
8376 191.90 -6002 0.0508 -0.0822 -0.1519 
8579 62.2 6106 0.0337 0.0992 0.1800 
0.34 <.01 0.33 0.14 0.41 0.41 
0.64 -0.22 0.14 -0.003 0.03 
5.4 
27020 138.26 -12764 16.003 
8445 71.65 5550 8.249 
<.01 0.06 0.03 0.06 . 
0.46 -0.46 
5.5 
39023 -20004 16.590 
2908 3748 1.960 
<.01 <.01 <.01 
-0.72 0.46 
5.5Ab 
Coef. 24063 -16853 8.927 
s.e. 2916 2453 1.660 
SR Elast. -0.61 . 0.25 
a See Table 2 for variable definitions and sources. 
b Estimated by autoregressive least squares; first-order autoregressive coefficient -0.15. 
R2 
E G TI(t-1) DW 
0.2392 0.258 
0.0711 
<.01 0.776 
-282.4 -0.707 0.0704 0.442 
200.3 0.1645 0.0523 
-0.17 <.01 0.19 0.501 
-0.05 -0.16 
-0.7806 0.3214 0.870 
0.1558 0.0967 
<.01 <.01 1.420 
-0.18 
-0.6253 0.1653 0.567 
0.1560 0.0661 
<.01 0.02 0.933 
-0.15 
-0.4938 0.0695 0.812 
0.0967 0.0299 
<.01 0.03 0.985 
-0.11 
-0.3000 0.5762 0.895 
0.0722 0.0826 
-0.07 
7. Each 1 percent increase in direct payments is predicted to reduce farm 
numbers .11 percent in the short run and .12 percent in the long run according 
to equation 5.5, and .07 in the short run and .17 percent in the long run 
according to equation 5.5A. 
Share of Farm Income from Farm Sources 
As noted earlier in the discussion of the conceptual model, greater off-farm income 
reduces dependence on income from the farm for a farm family, reducirig demand for farm 
employment ceteris paribus. The coefficient of the proportioh of farm net income from farm 
sources FY was not significant in equations for FAR perhaps because of multicollinearity 
problems but the logic of a relationship between FY and FAR is inescapable. The impact 
of government program and other variables on FY is shown in Table 6. 
1. Prices alone in equation 6.1 account for a considerable proportion of the 
variation in FY. The principal impact comes through the machinery-labor 
price ratio. A 10 percent increase in the relative price of machinery is 
predicted to raise the proportion of farm income from farm sources .1 percent 
in the short run and .7 percent in the long run. It may be noted that this 
long-run elasticity is comparable to the elasticity found in equation 6.3 without 
a distributed lag. Thus 6.3 may be regarded as a long-run equation. 
2. Farm commodity program variables alone account for a modest share of 
variation in FY in equation 6.2. The specification is incomplete without other 
variables. None of the program variables has a significant coefficient. 
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Table 6. Statistical Results of Least Squares Regression of Share of Farmers' Income from Farm Sources (FY) 
on Selected Independent Variables with U.S. Annual Data from 1950 to 1987. 
Indeuendent Variables" Rz 
Equation Constant PF(t-1) PMPL(t-1) TIM E G FY(t-1) DW 
6.1 
Coef. 17.260 -0.1239 0.3115 0.8801 0.966 
s.e. 9.139 0.0753 0.0323 0.0522 
pr> It I 0.07 0.10 <.01 <.01 2.097 
SR Elast. -0.29 0.01 
6.2 
20.567 -0.8737 -0.00049 0.7778 0.412 
13.034 0.7088 0.00068 0.2058 
0.12 0.23 0.47 <.01 0.833 
-0.12 -0.08 
6.3 
140.19 3.1855 -0.4470 -0.00545 0.869 
10.83 0.5208 0.0822 0.00396 
<.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 2.339 
0.08 -0.89 -0.30 
6.3Ab 
Cocf. 102.96 5.5459 -0.8192 0.00037 0.899 
s.e. 17.78 10.392 0.2506 0.00032 
SR Elast. 0.14 . -1.64 0.06 
a See Table 2 for variable definitions and sources. 
b Estimated by autoregressive least squares; first-order autoregressive coefficient 0.854. 
3. The significant negative coefficient on G in equation 6.3 indicates that 
increased government program payments reduce the share of all farm income 
coming from farming. Because payments are counted as income from "farm 
sources" and hence raise FY, the relationship is unexpected and is probably 
a spurious result. The coefficient is negative probably because government 
payments are large when net cash receipts from farming are low. 
4. Equation 6.3A estimated by autoregressive least squares shows no significant 
impact on FY from farm programs. Results from Table 6 are not used 
subsequently in the summary to calculate the impact of government programs 
on farm numbers. 
Aggregate Farm Resource Productivity 
Aggregate farm productivity SX was not included in equations of Table 3 because 
the objective is to measure farm numbers and size in terms of resource volume or area 
rather than output or sales. Also the theoretical justification for including SX as an 
intermediate variable measuring the impact of greater economic stability on farm numbers 
was not supported empirically. Selected results of various specifications of an SX equation 
are included in Table 7. 
1. Price variables included in this study account alone for 78 (adjusted R2) 
percent of the variation in productivity SX in equation 7.1. It is notable that 
higher factor terms of trade, a measure of incentives to expand overall 
resource use, do not increase productivity. In fact, higher real prices PF may 
reduce productivity. 
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2. Commodity program variables alone account for only . 25 percent of the 
variation in SX (equation 7.2). 
3. With prices included with program variables to more completely specify the 
equation for productivity, no program variable coefficients were significant. 
4. Equation 7.3A estimated by autoregressive least squares also gives no support 
to the proposition that commodity programs enhance farming productivity. 
The sign of the PMPL coefficient changes between equations 7.3 and 7.3A, 
but the elasticities are so low in absolute value that the overall impact of the 
variable can be ignored without much injustice to reality. 
Commodity programs reduce output by removing land from production but diverted 
acres are included in calculation of the SX denominator, all production resources. Hence, 
by construction, programs reduce productivity. That conclusion could be inferred from the 
negative coefficient of G for government programs in equation 7.3. 
Results in Table 7 provide no support for the "treadmill hypothesis" that commodity 
programs increase productivity either directly through E and G or indirectly by improving 
price terms of trade PF. Hence SX is ignored in subsequent calculation of responses of 
farm numbers to commodity program variables. 
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Table 7. Statistical Results of Least Squares Regression of Aggregate Farm Productivity (SX) 
on Selected Independent Variables ,vith U.S. Annual Data from 1950 to 1987. 
Indenendent Variables• R2 
Equation Constant PF(t-1) PMPL(t-1) TIM E G SX(t-1) DW 
7.1 
Coef. 49.44 -0.5817 0.5507 1.093 0.784 
s.e. 19.79 0.2614 0.0869 0.114 
pr> It I 0.02 0.03 <.01 <.01 1.590 
SR Elast. -0.49 0.01 
7.2 
61.12 0.1687 0.00225 0.2066 0.248 
8.72 1.0480 0.00084 0.1063 
<.01 0.87 0.01 0.06 0.364 
0.01 0.13 
7.3 
21.21 -0.3316 -1.8040 0.3568 -0.00036 0.9037 0.928 
13.42 0.1740 0.7125 0.1087 0.00034 0.1046 
0.12 0.07 0.02 <.01 0.30 <-.01 2.452 
-0.28 -0.02 0.26 -0.002 
7.3Ab 
Coef. -14.16 -0.2051 6.1256 1.4848 -0.00014 0.1883 0.950 
s.e. 15.69 0.1241 12.2970 0.2909 0.00031 0.1956 
SR Elast. -0.17 0.06 1.07 -0.01 
a See Table 2 for variable definitions and sources. 
b Estimated by autoregressive least squares; first-ordet autoregressive coefficient -0.016. 
Conclusions 
I conclude by responding to each of the six hypotheses listed earlier and quantify the 
impact of commodity programs in the short and long run. The last equation in each table 
is the basis for estimates and conclusions. 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in diverted acres A and excess capacity E has a very 
minor direct impact on farm numbers (and on farm size measured in acres if aggregate 
acreage is fixed so numbers and size are perfectly and inversely correlated). The elasticity 
of FAR with respect to E is only -.06 according to equation· 3.3 and only -.04 according to 
equation 3.3A. However, excess capacity E may influence FAR through PF. 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in direct payments G (the strongest measure of program 
direct impacts in nearly all equations and much superior to the overall government outlays 
variable G', excess capacity E, or diverted acres A) does indeed seem to significantly 
influence farm numbers. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that commodity 
programs encourage farms to consolidate and grow in size and decline in numbers. 
However, the direct impact of a 10 percent increase in G is to decrease farm numbers by 
only .8 to .9 percent according to equations 3.3 and 3.3A. 
Hypothesis 3: The general hypothesis that commodity programs increase farm size 
and decrease numbers because reduced variance of income raises labor productivity or 
aggregate productivity is not supported by this study. 
Hypothesis 4: The Cochrane hypothesis that farm commodity programs decrease 
farm numbers and increase farm size is doubly rejected. That is, no statistical evidence 
indicated (a) that farm commodity programs increased farm resource productivity SX or (b) 
that SX influenced farm numbers FAR. 
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Hypothesis 5: This study does not support the hypothesis that programs influence 
income through the permanent income affect. The propensity to invest out of transitory 
positive income was not found to exceed the propensity from permanent income. Programs 
may induce stability but this study did not indicate that stability of income influenced 
investment or productivity. 
Hypothesis 6: Results of this study indicate that commodity programs do not change 
farm numbers much in the short run or in the long run. Each 1 percent increase in excess 
capacity reduces numbers .04 to .06 percent and each 1 percent increase in government 
payments directly reduces numbers .08 to .09 percent (equations 3.3 nd 3.3A). But each 1 
percent increase in excess capacity raises real farm prices at least 2 percent, causing farm 
numbers to increase .2 to .4 percent -- more than offsetting the direct impact of E and G 
in the short run. Thus programs in net retain farms in the short run according to the results 
of this analysis. 
Based on the formula shown in the footnote, elasticities of farm numbers with 
respect to program variables in the long run are estimated to be 
dFAR E 
dE FAR 
dFAR G 
dG FAR 
= -.04 in the short and long run from equation 3.3A 
= -.01 in the long run from equation 3.3A, 4.4A, and 5.5.5 
The result is consistent with hypothesis 6 but the magnitude of elasticities is too small to 
make a case the coefficients differ from zero. Furthermore, equations 3.3, 4.4, and 5.5 give 
a positive long-term elasticity of farm numbers with respect to more government 
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intervention. However, the autoregressive least square result is preferred because of 
autocorrelation in ordinary least squares. 
In short, statistical inference suggests farm commodity programs as measured herein 
modestly increase farm numbers in the short run and slightly decrease farm numbers in the 
long run. The strong impact of payments G dominates all other impacts of programs 
through excess capacity, acreage diversion, or total government outlays.· One interpretation 
is that income effects from G overshadow diversion effects reflected in A and E because 
of slippage in controls, targeting of direct payments to farms most vulnerable to failure, or 
for other reasons. Another interpretation is that the variable G may be reflecting the 
impacts of acreage diversion because program variables are correlated. The simple 
correlation coefficient of G with A is .83, with E is .33, and with total government outlays 
G' is .59 for the 1950-87 period. 
The model was formulated to favor identification of program impacts. If anything, 
the small impacts found would be expected to have upward bias. Analysis could be 
improved by more accurate data and by disaggregation by farm commodity type, size, and 
region. Simultaneous equation estimation techniques also might improve results. 
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Annex Table 1. Statistical Results of Least Squares Regression of Farm Population (POP) 
on Selected Independent Variables with U.S. Annual Data from 1950 to 1987. 
Indenendent Variables" 
Equation Constant PF(t-1) PMPL lnXL InTI. InS X E G 
A.1 
Coef. 13831 -98.084 -2967.98 
s.e. 1326.3 8.513 1413.32 
pr> It I <.01 <.01 0.04 
SR Elast. -1.66 -0.54 
A.2 
3691 -118.24 -0.1618 
836 93.682 0.0844 
<.01 0.22 0.06 
-0.11 -0.19 
A.3 
12473 3289.45" 13827 -3155.77 -5484.92 -0.1494 
23171 993.50 1424 1024.15 1889.01 0.0364 
0.54 <.01 <.01 <.01 0.01 <.01 
0.56 2.36 -0.54 -0.94 -0.18 
a See text Table 2 for variable definitions and sources. 
b lnPF for year t. 
R2 
POP(t-1) DW 
0.8285 0.985 
0.0202 
<.01 1.951 
0.7991 0.919 
0.0448 
<.01 0.816 
0.994 
2.01 
1. The simple correlation coefficient between TI and SX is only -.03 for the 1950-86 period 
so collinearity is not a problem between these variables. 
2. Off-farm earnings L' was included in the empirical model but the coefficient was 
insignificant. The variable was dropped to reduce multicollinearity. 
3. A special effort was made to deal with the changing definition of a farm. The "old" 
definition ($250 of sales rather than $1,000) was retained to 1982 and the new definition 
used thereafter in measuring farm population. A dummy equal to 1.0 for years 1982-87, 
zeros elsewhere, was included as a independent variable. The coefficient was highly 
insignificant. One interpretation is that the tax rate reduction beginning in 1982 offset. 
Another is that a farm with sales of $1,000 in the late 1980s was equivalent in real size to 
one with $250 in sales in earlier years. 
4. Total real production assets replacing TI in the model performed less well. 
5. Long run elasticity where FAR= F is 
(dF/dG)(G/F) • (8Ff8G)(G/F)+[(8Ff8XL)(XL/F)(8XL/8G)(G/XL)]+[(8F/8XL)(XL/F)(8XL/8n)(TI/XL)(8n/8G)(G/TI)J+[(8F/8n)(TI/F)(8n/8G)(Gfl1)] 
(Equation Source) (33) (33) (4AA) (33) (4AA) (Ssl (33) (55) 
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